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Abstract 
Bayesian Networks (BN) provide robust 
probabilistic methods of reasoning under un­
certainty, but despite their formal grounds 
are strictly based on the notion of condi­
tional dependence, not much attention has 
been paid so far to their use in dependability 
analysis. The aim of this paper is to pro­
pose BN as a suitable tool for dependability 
analysis, by challenging the formalism with 
basic issues arising in dependability tasks. 
We will discuss how both modeling and anal­
ysis issues can be naturally dealt with by 
BN. Moreover, we will show how some limi­
tations intrinsic to combinatorial dependabil­
ity methods such as Fault Trees can be over­
come using BN. This will be pursued through 
the study of a real-world example concerning 
the reliability analysis of a redundant digital 
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) with 
majority voting 2:3 
1 Introduction 
Dependability analysis involves a set of methodologies 
dealing with the reliability aspects of large, safety­
critical systems [9, 10]. Two main categories of ap­
proaches can be identified: combinatorial methods and 
state-space based methods. The first category requires 
a description of the system to be analyzed in terms of 
components and their interactions. In particular, com­
ponents are modeled as binary events corresponding to 
component up and component down respectively, while 
interactions are usually described by means of boolean 
AND/OR gates. The advantage of such techniques is 
that they are component-oriented and that simple for­
malisms like Fault Trees (FT) can be adopted. How­
ever, some major simplificative assumptions are usu­
ally needed, both at the modeling and analysis level. 
On the contrary, state-space approaches rely on the 
specification of the whole set of possible states of the 
system and on the modeling of the possible transi­
tions among them. Markov Chain methods are usu­
ally adopted in this case, giving the analyst the pos­
sibility of explicitly considering all possible interac­
tions among components. The main disadvantage is 
that, even for not very large systems, using directly 
the approach may be unfeasable due to the huge di­
mensionality of the considered state-space. The usual 
solutions is then to resort to partial state descriptions 
like Petri Nets [11] or Bayesian Networks based mod­
els [5 ] .  However, state-space approaches are essen­
tially used when emphasis is on temporal evolution 
of the systems, while combinatorial methods concen­
trate more on static aspects as the logical interactions 
of the components1. 
In this paper we aim at considering combinatorial 
methods for dependability analysis, by showing how 
basic problems addressed by the approach can be prof­
itably dealt with by using Bayesian Networks. In 
particular we will concentrate on Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) and on the modeling and analysis issues that 
are involved in this task. We will show that any FT can 
be mapped into a BN and that any analysis that can 
be performed on the FT can be performed by means 
of BN inference. In addition, standard modeling tech­
nique of BN like noisy gates, multi-state variables or 
common cause identification, can overcome some basic 
modeling limitations of fault-trees , while interesting 
analysis neglected in FTA can be naturally obtained 
by classical BN inference. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses 
basics of fault-tree analysis, while in section 3 an al­
gorithm for mapping a FT into a BN is proposed; in 
section 4 the suitability of a BN for dependability anal­
ysis is investigated and in section 5 basic extensions to 
1 As we will see, this does not means that time is not 
considered, but only that temporal evolution is not directly 
modeled. 
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FTA provided by Bayesian networks are discussed, to­
gether with the improvements they provide both at 
the modeling and at the analysis level. 
2 Fault-Tree Analysis 
Combinatorial models of dependability have a poor 
modeling power coupled with a high analytical 
tractability based on the assumption of statistically in­
dependent component. Among them, Fault-Tree Anal­
ysis {FTA) has become very popular for the analysis of 
large safety-critical systems [9, 10]. The goal of FTA 
is to represent the combination of elementary causes, 
called the primary events, that lead to the occurrence 
of an undesired catastrophic event, the so called Top 
Event (TE). FTA is carried out in two steps: a quali­
tative step, in which the list of all the possible combi­
nations of primary events (the minimal cut-sets) that 
give rise to the TE is determined and a quantitative 
step where, if probability values can be assigned ( di­
rectly or by computation) to all the events appearing 
in the tree, the probability of occurrence of the TE can 
also be calculated. 
The qualitative analysis step is considered very im­
portant in dependability analysis and safety studies, 
since it allows the analyst to enumerate all the possi­
ble causes of failure for the system and to rank them 
according to a very simple severity measure given by 
the (prior) failure probabilities of components. How­
ever, because of the simplicity of the model, only prior 
failure probability can be considered and no kind of 
scenarios more specific than cut-sets can be computed. 
The major weak point of the FTA methodology (as 
well as of any combinatorial technique), is the fact that 
the events must be considered as statistically indepen­
dent. The aim of the present paper is to show that, 
even by representing knowledge as in combinatorial 
models, alternative formalisms like Bayesian networks 
can be profitably adopted to overcome their limita­
tions. Let us now introduce some basic notions con­
cerning FTA: 
Definition 1 A fault tree {FT) is a tree comprising 
five types of nodes: primary events, events, two types 
of elementary logical gates, namely AND gates and OR 
gates, and one derived logical gate, namely the k out 
of n gate k: n {see Figure 1). 
The root of a FT is an event called the Top Event 
(TE), representing the failure of the whole system. 
Each event has exactly one successor which can be ei­
ther a primary event or a logical gate. A logical gate 
has two or more successors, which are all events; a 
k out of n gate has exactly n successor events. The 
leaves of the tree are all primary events. 
Primary 
Event event 
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Figure 1: Basic Notation for FTA 
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Figure 2: The PLC Case Study 
The events considered in any FT are binary events, 
that is they may just assume logical values true or 
false. Since events are used to represent the func­
tional behavior of a given sub-system, the logical val­
ues are put in correspondence with faulty and working 
behavior respectively. In particular, primary events 
are associated to system components. A FT is then 
constructed by combining primary and general events 
with logical gates, in order to model the functional 
behavior of the whole system to be analyzed. 
Example 1. Let use introduce a simple but real PLC 
system, that we will use as a case study throughout the 
paper. The block diagram of such a system is shown in 
figure 2. The PLC system is intended to process a digi­
tal signal by means of suitable processing units; in par­
ticular, a redundancy technique is adopted, in order to 
achieve fault tolerance, so three different channels are 
used to process the signal and a voter hardware device, 
with majority voting 2 : 3, is collecting channel results 
to produce the output. For each channel (identified 
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Figure 3: Fault Tree for the PLC System 
as channels ChA, Chn and Chc respectively) a digital 
input unit (DI), a processing unit (CPU) and a digi­
tal output unit (DO) are employed. The digital signal 
elaborated by a given channel is transmitted among 
units through a special bus called lObus. Moreover, 
redundancy is present also at the CPU level; indeed, 
each CPU receives from its digital input unit the sig­
nal to be elaborated, but it also receives a copy of the 
signal from other input channels. For doing this, a 
bunch of three buses is used, called TribusA, Tribusn 
and Tribusc respectively; the !Obusx of channel Chx 
delivers the signal of the digital input of channel Chx 
(Dlx) to tri-buses of other channels (i.e. to Tribusy 
with Y # X) and CPU x reads the signal from other 
input channels from Tribusx. Each CPU performs 
then a software majority voting 2 : 3 for determining 
the input signal. Finally, the system is completed by a 
redundancy on the power supply system: two indepen­
dent power supply units ( P S1 and P S2) are connected 
to other components, in such a way that the simulta­
neous failure of both P S units is needed to prevent the 
system to work. 
The FT for this PLC system is reported in figure 3. 
Notice that 2 : 3 gates are used to model the fault 
of the input part of each channel (since each CPU 
adopts a 2 : 3 majority voting) and the fault corre­
sponding to the fault of at least 2 channels (since the 
voter also uses a 2 : 3 majority voting). Notice also 
that sub-trees rooted at a given channel X are sim­
ilarly replicated for other channel different from X; 
indeed, notation ChA/B and ChA/C is used to indi­
cate that sub-trees rooted at Chn and Chc are equal 
to the sub-tree rooted at ChA with A substituted with 
B and C respecti vely2• 
Given a model like the FT of figure 3, some typical 
analysis can be performed. 
Qualitative Analysis. Given the FT, to determine 
the minimal cut-sets (MCS), i.e. the minimal (with 
respect to set inc! usion) set of primary events causing 
the occurrence of the TE(the prime implicants of the 
TE). 
Quantitative Analysis. i) Given probabilistic in­
formation about truth of primary events (i.e. about 
failure of components), to determine the probability 
of occurrence of any event in the FT and in particular 
of the TE. ii) Given MCS, to determine their impor­
tance, also called their unreliability. 
MCS determination is usually based on minimization 
techniques on the set of boolean functions represented 
by the gates of the FT. The cardinality of a cut-set is 
called its order. The FT of figure 3 has 59 MCS, one 
of order I (corresponding to the voter faulty) and the 
remaining 58 of order 2. For instance, a MCS of order 
2 that can immediately be derived from the FT of fig­
ure 3 is {PS1, PS2} corresponding to the simultaneous 
failure of both power suppliers. 
Concerning quantitative analysis, the most common 
assumption made in FTA is to assume that compo­
nents corresponding to primary events have an expo­
nentially distributed failure time. This means that 
the probability of having component C faulty at time 
t (alternatively the probability of occurrence of the 
primary event C = faulty) is P(C = faulty, t) = 
I - e->-ct, where >.c is the failure rate of component 
c. 
Given the failure rates of each component, FTA can 
determine at any time instant t, the probability of oc­
currence of any event and in particular the probability 
of system failure (the TE) at timet. Moreover, the so­
called unreliability of MCS at timet can be computed. 
This corresponds to the probability of the joint occur­
rence of events in the cut-set at timet; because of the 
independence assumption made on the occurrence of 
primary events, this corresponds to the product of the 
probability of occurrence of each primary event in the 
cut-set at time t3. 
2 Actually events lnpA, lnpB and lnpc have to be dealt 
appropriately by making a double indexing with respect to 
the channels; this should be more clear in the following. 
30ther kind of quantitative information such as the 
mean time to failure and the variance of time to failure 
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Component Failure Rate (f/h) Failure Prob. 
lObus 
Tribus 
Voter 
DO 
DI 
PS 
CPU 
>.w - 2.0 10 9 
ATri = 2.0 10-9 
>-v = 6.6 10-8 
>-vo = 2.45 Io-7 
>.DI = 2.8 10-7 
APS = 3.37 10-7 
>.cpu = 4.82 10-7 
0.00080 
0.00080 
0.02605 
0.09335 
0.10595 
0.12611 
0.17535 
Table 1: Failure Rates and Probabilities for PLC Com­
ponents 
MCS 
{CPUA, CPUB} 
{CPUB, CPUc} 
{CPUA, CPUc} 
{Voter} 
{CPUA, DOc} 
{CPUA, DOB} 
{CPUB, DOA} 
{CPUB, DOc} 
{CPUc, DOA} 
{CPUc, DOB} 
{PS,, PS2} 
Unrel. 
0.03075 
0.03075 
0.03075 
0.02605 
0.01637 
0.01637 
0.01637 
0.01637 
0.01637 
0.01637 
0.01590 
Post. Unrel. 
0.13943 
0.13943 
0.13943 
0.11812 
0.07423 
0.07423 
0.07423 
0.07423 
0.07423 
0.07423 
0.07212 
Post. Prob. 
0.04533 
0.04533 
0.04533 
0.02681 
0.02195 
0.02195 
0.02195 
0.02195 
0.02195 
0.02195 
0.02088 
Table 2: Top 11 MCS for PLC System 
Example 2. In the system of figure 2, the fail­
ure rates (in terms of failure/hour) shown in ta­
ble 1 can be assumed by considering exponentially 
distributed failure time. Table 1 also shows the fail­
ure probability of components after 4 · 105 hours of 
system operation. FTA can then compute the prob­
ability of system failure at time t = 4 · 105 hours as 
P( TE ) :::: 0.22053. Similarly, the probability of any 
other event of the FT can be obtained. For example 
the probability of having a failure in the input part of 
a channel (P(Inx =faulty) = 0.03248, X= A, B, C) 
or the probability of failure of at least two channels 
(P(Ch =faulty)= 0.18674). 
Finally, MCS can be ranked in order of unreliability; 
table 2 shows the first 11 MC'S and in the second col­
umn (Unrel.) their corresponding unreliability. We 
can easily verify that the most critical components are 
the C' PUs, since the cut-sets involving a failure of at 
least two CPUs are those showing larger unreliability. 
In the next sections we will show that, by using 
Bayesian networks, besides to perform the above anal­
yses we can augment both the modeling and the anal­
ysis power in dependability tasks. 
can be obtained, but this is usually a matter of general 
reliability analysis not peculiar to FTA. 
3 Mapping Fault Trees to Bayesian 
Networks 
Given a FT, it is straightforward to map it into a 
binary BN, where every variable has two admissible 
values: false corresponding to a normal or working 
value and true corresponding to a faulty or not-working 
value. The conversion can be obtained as follows: 
• for each leaf node of the FT, create a root node 
in the BN; however, if several leaves of the FT 
represent the same primary event (i.e. the same 
component), create just one root node in the BN 
to represent all of them. 
• for each pair (gate, output-event) of the FT, create 
a corresponding node in the BN; 
• connects nodes in the BN as corresponding nodes 
are connected in the FT; 
• for each node of the BN created from an AND (re­
spectively OR) gate, create a Conditional Proba­
bility Table (CPT) such that the node is true with 
probability I iff all parent nodes are true (respec­
tively iff at least one parent node is true); 
• for each node created from a k out of n gate, cre­
ate a CPT such that the node is true with prob­
ability 1 iff at least k out of n parent nodes are 
true. 
Prior probabilities on root nodes have to be established 
by considering a given time point t. Given a root node 
C, the probability of C = true will be set to the proba­
bility of occurrence of the corresponding primary event 
at time t (i.e. P(C = faulty), t) = 1- e->-ct). It 
should be clear that from the above conversion non­
root nodes of the BN are actually deterministic nodes, 
i.e. special chance ( random) nodes with associated 
a deterministic function for their value determination 
(8]. 
F igure 4 shows the structure of the BN for the PLC 
system of figure 2 and derived from the FT of figure 3. 
Random variable nodes (i.e. root nodes) are shown 
as gray ovals, while deterministic variable nodes are 
empty ovals. Notice that, as mentioned in section 2, 
events of type I np actually need two indices to distin­
guish the cases where a T ribus is involved from those 
where it is not. Prior probabilities for roots can be 
obtained from table 1 for time t = 4 · 105 hours. Near 
each deterministic node is indicated the boolean func­
tion represented. The user has just to specify the type 
of function: CPT specification can then be automati­
cally obtained4. 
4 Alternatively, the number of required probabilities can 
be reduced by techniques like the asymmetric assessment 
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F igure 4: Bayesian Net for the PLC System: first letter of a double index denotes a channel 
4 Dependability Analysis with 
Bayesian Networks 
Typical FTA can be performed quite naturally in a BN 
setting. In particular, concerning MCS determination 
(i.e. qualitative analysis), because any deterministic 
node of the BN correspond to a boolean gate of the 
FT, any kind of technique adopted in FTA for com­
puting MCS can be applied also for the corresponding 
Bl'f'. However, as we shall see in the following, the 
BN framework can refine the notion of cut-set when 
uncertainty about combinatorial knowledge has to be 
introduced (see section 5). Concerning quantitative 
analysis, a BN can in principle computes the posterior 
probability of any set of variables Q given the evidence 
set E (i.e. P(QIE )), so any kind of probabilistic com­
putation that can be performed in FTA can also be 
performed by BN inference. In particular the follow­
ing parameters can be computed at timet: 
probability of occurrence of an event; it corre­
sponds to the computation of the prior marginal at 
time t on the node corresponding to the given event; 
unreliability of MCS; it corresponds to the compu­
tation of the joint prior on nodes mentioned in the 
(6]. 5More specific techniques relying on the "logical seman­
tics" of a EN in terms of Hom clauses (13, 14] can also be 
devised, by adopting abductive reasoning. 
cut-set at time t6• 
Concerning the first point, the marginals of all the fail­
ure events represented in the net can be computed by 
BN probability propagation [12]. However, standard 
BN inference usually deals with posterior probability 
computation, while the above issue are only related 
to prior information (i.e. to prediction of particular 
events at timet). In fact, by considering the occur­
rence of a failure, posterior information can be very 
relevant for dependability and reliability aspects. 
Example 3. Suppose the system failure has been ob­
served in the PLC system (i.e. the TE has occurred). 
A Belief Updating [12] algorithm can be used to com­
pute marginal posteriors on root nodes. Results are 
summarized in table 3. Notice for instance that, dif­
ferently from the prior information, after observing the 
fault, a digital output unit is less reliable than a digi­
tal input one; this is reasonable since the difference in 
prior reliability was very small and the input part of 
a channel has more redundancy that the output part. 
This information cannot be directly obtained in FTA; 
it can be deduced by the fact that cut-sets involving 
digital output units have a higher unreliability thah 
those containing digital inputs (see table 2). Marginal 
posterior probability of nodes corresponding to non 
primary events (i.e. to sub-systems failure) can simi­
larly be computed. 
6 As in FTA this is obtained by multiplying the prior of 
the true value of each node in the cut-set. 
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Component Post. Failure Prob. 
Tribus 
lObus 
Voter 
DI 
PS 
DO 
CPU 
0.00175 
0.00208 
0.11812 
0.17167 
0.17603 
0.20433 
0.38382 
Table 3: Posterior Probabilities for PLC Components 
Regarding MCS analysis, BN inference can be more 
precise than usual FTA; indeed, (Composite) Belief 
Revzszon [12] algorithms can be used to compute pos­
terior probability of MCS. Even if the ranking provided 
by prior unreliability of MCS is the same as the one 
provided by posterior unreliability 7, posterior unrelia­
bility is a more reliable measure. Table 2 reports such 
�arameters on the third column. Notice that, even 
1f such values are in principle computable also with 
FTA (after the computation of the probability of the 
TE), FTA tools usually report just the information of 
table 2. 
Finally, composite queries can provide results more 
specific than MCS; indeed, in a MCS no commitments 
is made to unmentioned events. More specific informa­
tion can be obtained by setting for query in BN infer­
ence all primary events. If we consider a component­
oriented framework for system analysis (as is done in 
reliability), then MCS corresponds to partial or kerc 
nel diagnoses, while a composite query on every pri­
mary event will produce complete diagnoses (in terms 
of component behavioral modes) [3]. While in a log­
ical setting kernel diagnoses can be suitably adopted 
for concisely explain a system failure, in probabilistic 
analysis this is no longer true, since marginalization 
operations can provide counter-intuitive results [12]. 
If we interpret each entry of the first column of table 2 
as assigning the faulty mode to mentioned components 
and the working mode to unmentioned ones, we can 
interpret the MCS as diagnoses whose posterior prob­
ability if given in the last column of the table. Notice 
that, even if the top 11 diagnoses of our problem ac­
tually correspond to top 11 MCS in the same order 
of probability, this is not true in general, since diag­
noses corresponding to non-minimal cut-sets may have 
a larger probability than some diagnoses correspond­
ing to MCS. For instance, even if the PLC system has 
59 MCS, the 18th (in order of probability) diagnosis is 
the one corresponding to all CPUs faulty and every 
7Since MCS are prime implicants of the TE the condi­
tional probability of TE given a MCS is 1, so the posterior 
of a MCS given the TE differs from the prior only for the 
constant P( TE)-1• 
other component working (probability 0.00963) and 
this does not correspond to a MCS. 
5 Augmenting Modeling Power 
There are essentially three main features of BN for­
malism that may be exploited to improve combina­
torial dependability analysis: noisy gates, multi-state 
variables and sequential failure dependence. 
5.1 Noisy gates 
Di�erently from fault-trees, in a BN dependency re­
latwns between events or variables are not restricted 
to be deterministic. In dependability terms, this cor­
responds to being able to model uncertainty in the 
behavior of the "gates" that in a FT represent inter­
actions between sub-systems. Of particular attention 
for reliability aspects is one peculiar modeling feature 
often used in building BN models: noisy gates. The 
most common kind of noisy gate is the noisy-or model 
[12] and its generalizations [7]; this kind of model can 
be profitably used in dependability, since it allows a 
simple probabilistic generalization of boolean gates. 
Consider, in the PLC case study, a situation in which 
more fault-tolerance is added to the system by means 
of a third spare power supplier that is available un­
der certain circumstances; in particular, it is shared 
by other systems and it is available only if it is not al­
ready in use. In this situation, it is no longer true that 
when both modeled suppliers are down, also the sys­
tem is certainly down, since the control system could 
switch to the spare supplier. Suppose that, from sta­
tistical information, we know that the spare supplier is 
available the 30% of time when the P S sub-system is 
down: we can model the uncertainty about the avail­
ability of the spare supplier by transforming the gate 
corresponding to the TE in a noisy-or gate with the 
following parameters (remember that TE= true means 
system failure): 
c(TE = true/PS =working, Voter::= working ,Ch = 
working) = 0 
c(TE = true/PS =faulty)= 0.7 
c(TE =true/Voter= f aulty) = P(TE = true/Ch = 
faulty) = 1 
As done in [2] we use c instead of P to emphasize the 
fact that these are not standard conditional proba­
bilities. The noisy-or independence assumption about 
causes of the TE is in this case reasonable and we could 
conclude that the system is down when only the PS 
sub-system is down with probability 
P(TE = true/PS =faulty, Voter= working, Ch  = 
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working)= 1- (1- 0.7) = 0.7 
corresponding to the percentage of times that the spare 
supplier is not available, while if all causes are present 
we obtain 
P(TE = trueiPS = faulty, Voter = faulty,Ch = 
faulty) = 1- (0.3 · 0 · 0) = 1 
Moreover, another important modeling issue in de­
pendability analysis is the problem usually referred as 
the common causes problem, where the system may 
go down, even in the presence of components up. This 
usually refer to the presence of some common unknown 
cause of failure that has been neglected in the model. 
This is naturally treated in a BN by means of leak 
probabilities [15] .  In the above example, we may have 
that the TE may be true even when both P S, Voter 
and C h sub-systems are functioning, because of a com­
mon cause problem; by assuming a leak probability 
l = 1 · 10-4 the first parameter becomes 
c(TE = trueiPS =working, Voter= working,Ch = 
working) = l = 0.0001 
and the unreliability of the system when sub-systems 
PS, Voter and Ch are down becomes 
P(TE = trueiPS =faulty, Voter= working,Ch = 
working)= 1- ((1- 0.7) · (1- 0.0001) )  = 0.70003 
which is slightly larger than in the case where no com­
mon cause problem was present. 
Dually from noisy-or, we could also use a noisy-and 
gate to generalize AND gates of the FT. For instance, 
by considering the possibility of failure of wire con­
nections from power supply units, we can model the 
fact that, even if only one supplier is down, the P S 
sub-system is also down (because connections from the 
other supplier are not working). More specifically, if 
we assume that this event has a probability of 0.01, 
then we can specify the noisy-and as 
c(P S = faultyiPS1 =faulty, P S2  =faulty) = 1 
c(PS = faultyiPS1 =working)= 0.01 
c(PS = faultyiPS2 =working)= O.Dl 
and then to compute 
P(PS = faultyiPS1 = working, PS2 =working) = 
0.01 . 0.01 = 0.0001 
corresponding to the simultaneous independent failure 
of connections from both supplier. 
5.2 Multi-state variables 
The working/faulty dichotomy of FTA can be im­
proved towards the most reasonable approach of deal­
ing with variables having more than two values (multi-
state variables). This is particularly useful for primary 
events, since in this way the system component they 
refer to can be modeled by means of multiple behav­
ioral modes [4]. In fact, components may manifest 
more than one failure mode (e.g open/short) and the 
failure modes may have a very different effect on the 
system operation (e.g. fail-safe/fail-danger). Suppose 
to consider a three-state component whose states are 
identified as working (w), fail-open (f-o) and fail-short 
(f-s). In FTA the component failure modes must be 
modeled as two independent binary events ( w/f-o) and 
(w/f-s); however, to make the model correct, a (non­
standard) XOR gate must be inserted between f-o and 
f-s since they are mutually exclusive events. On the 
contrary, Bayesian networks can include n-ary vari­
ables by adjusting the entries of the CPT. Saving in 
assessment provided by classical noisy-or in case of bi­
nary variables can now be obtained through general­
izations to n-ary variables, like for instance the noisy­
max gate [15] .  In the next subsection we will return 
more specifically on this point. 
5.3 Sequentially Dependent Failures 
Another modeling issue that may be quite problem­
atic to deal with by using fault-trees is the problem of 
components failing in some dependent way. Bayesian 
networks may address this point by making explicit 
such a dependency in the structure of the net. Con­
sider for instance the case in which, in the PLC of fig­
ure 2, power suppliers may induce a CPU failure when 
failing; this can be due to the fact that a possible fault 
for power supplier is an over-voltage, causing a possible 
CPU damage (and then a CPU fault). While it is not 
possible to model this kind of information in a FT, in 
a BN it can be naturally modeled by connecting each 
power supplier to the CPU nodes. In particular, one 
can even be more precise, by resorting to multi-state 
variable modeling; indeed, each PS; unit (i = 1, 2) 
can be modeled with three ordered values, working, 
over.voltage, dead, and connected as a parent to each 
CPU node C PUx (X = {A, B, C}) with the following 
noisy-max parameters: 
c(CPUx faultyiPS1 working, PS2 
working) = 0 
c(CPUx = faultyiPS; = over.voltage) = 0.66667 
c(CPUx = faultyiPS; =dead)= 1 
The probability of getting a CPU fault when both the 
suppliers are in over-voltage can then be computed 
from noisy-max model as 
P(CPUx = JaultyiPS1 = over.voltage, PS2 = 
over .voltage) = 1 - (0.33333 · 0.33333) = 0.88889 
This shows how a flexible combination of basic features 
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of a BN can naturally overcome basic limitations of 
FTA. 
Finally, it is worth noting that, if uncertainty about 
combinatorial knowledge on components has to be 
modeled (either through noisy gates simplifications or 
through complete CPT specifications), the FTA notion 
of MCS does no longer make sense. In this case, the 
computation of diagnoses intended as composite be­
liefs on primary events as shown in section 4, provides 
a natural counterpart of the MCS concept. 
6 Conclusions 
In the present paper we have discussed the suitability 
of Bayesian networks for classical combinatorial de­
pendability analysis. A preliminary analysis on this 
topic was proposed in [1] (where no formal compari­
son with classical dependability analysis was provided) 
and in [16] (where the starting point are reliability 
block diagrams). We have shown that combinato­
rial formalisms like fault-trees can be formally mapped 
into binary BN and that classical FTA can be natu­
rally performed through BN inference. Basic features 
of BN allow to overcome limitations of FTA both at 
the modeling and at the analysis level. Among those, 
the possibility of modeling uncertainty at gates level, 
the use of multi-state variables and the modeling of de­
pendent failures have been investigated, as well as an­
alytical improvements over FTA like general posterior 
probabilistic inference. This has been done by consid­
ering a real-world dependability case study concerning 
a digital PLC, where the use of a BN methodology has 
shown the importance of all the above mentioned im­
provements. 
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